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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE CITY, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
: Case No. 
FREDERICK THOMAS GEORGE, 
Defendant/Appellant. : BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(d) (2002). 
Appellant Frederick Thomas George timely petitioned for interlocutory review of a trial 
court order dated June 7, 2006. See Order being appealed from at R. 84-90 in Addendum 
A. This Court granted Mr. George's petition for interlocutory review on the issues set 
forth below. See this Court's order granting interlocutory review in Addendum B. 
ISSUES PRESENTED, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION 
This Court granted interlocutory review on the following issue and subissues: 
Issue: Whether an officer's affidavit regarding the maintenance and certification of 
a machine used to test defendant's blood alcohol level is testimonial in nature so that its 
admission violates the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation where the officer is 
unavailable for cross-examination? 
Subissue I: Whether Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-515 which allows admission of an 
officer's affidavit made for the purposes of establishing at trial that the machine which 
officers used to test defendant's blood alcohol level had been properly maintained and 
was operating properly at the time of the incident, violates the Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation. 
Subissue II. Whether an expert may substitute testimony for another expert when 
the testifying witness did not perform the test, without violating the Sixth Amendment 
right to confrontation. 
Standard of Review: The question of whether the officer's affidavit is testimonial 
in nature involves a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. Salt Lake City v. 
Williams, 2005 UT App 493, If 10, 128 P.3d 47. A constitutional challenge to a statute 
also presents a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. State v. Green, 2004 UT 
76, T[42, 99 P.3d 820. 
Preservation: These issues were preserved by written motion and argument held at 
a hearing on February 8, 2006. The trial court entered a Memorandum Decision denying 
Mr. George's motion. See Addendum A. 
TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The texts of Utah Code Ann. §41-6a-515 (2005), former Utah Code Ann. §41-6-
44.3, and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution are in Addendum C. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The City filed an Information on April 12, 2005, charging Mr. George with 
driving under the influence (DUI), a class A misdemeanor, open container, a class B 
misdemeanor and violation of park curfew, an infraction. R. 1-2. Mr. George filed a 
motion in limine and supporting memorandum, requesting that the trial court exclude the 
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breath test affidavits prepared by a highway patrol trooper for use at DUI trials. R. 41-
60; a copy of the affidavits is in Addendum D. The City filed a motion in limine in 
response, asking the court to admit the intoxilyzer affidavits. R. 63-76. Following a 
hearing, the trial court denied Mr. George's motion to exclude the affidavits and issued a 
memorandum decision. See Addendum A. 
Mr.George filed a timely petition for interlocutory review, which this Court 
granted. See Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This case has not gone to trial and the City has not submitted any evidence. For 
purposes of the motion, Mr. George outlined the following facts, but clarified that he did 
not stipulate to this evidence or its accuracy: 
"On March 31, 2005 at 4:50 a.m., officers observed a white Chevy Lumina parked 
in the parking lot of a neighborhood park. Mr. George was in the driver's seat and 
officers noticed bottles of alcohol in the car. Two other individuals were in the back seat. 
The officers had Mr. George do field sobriety tests and took him to the station to submit 
to a breath test. The results showed that Mr. George's blood alcohol level was .13." R. 
41. 
The City seeks to admit evidence regarding Mr. George's blood alcohol content by 
submitting Intoxilyzer breath test results. For those results to be admissible at trial, the 
City must provide specific foundational evidence in compliance with Utah Code Ann. § 
41-6a-515 and Utah Administrative Rule 714-500 and must otherwise establish that the 
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machine was maintained and operating properly at the time officers used it to test Mr. 
George's blood alcohol level. 
In this case, the City seeks to establish necessary foundational evidence by using 
an affidavit prepared by a highway patrolman for use in criminal trials. R. 79-81. The 
officer, Trooper Camacho, is out of the country and unable to testify. R. 42. He has 
prepared two affidavits before and after March 31, 2005, stating, among other things, that 
he is competent to testify, has personal knowledge of the information in the affidavits, 
performed several tests with a sample on Intoxilyzer 5000/8000, serial number 68002336, 
and that the machine did not need repairs. R. 79-81. The breath test affidavits are in 
Addendum D. The City also apparently seeks to use Sergeant Steven Winward, Officer 
Camacho's supervisor, as a substitute expert even though Sergeant Winward did not 
perform the tests on the intoxilyzer and has no personal knowledge of the testing 
procedure Officer Camacho actually performed. R. 79. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in concluding that the breath test affidavits prepared by a 
highway patrol trooper for use at DUI trials were not testimonial and therefore could be 
admitted at tried without violating the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. The Sixth 
Amendment requires that a criminal defendant be afforded the right to confrontation 
when the state seeks to introduce testimonial evidence. Although the United States 
Supreme Court has not given a comprehensive definition of testimonial hearsay, it has 
indicated that evidence is testimonial if the declarant could have reasonably believed the 
evidence would be used in a later trial. Also, hearsay evidence is testimonial when 
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evidence is intended as a substitute for live testimony, the witness bears testimony by 
making an affirmative statement for the purpose of proving a fact, or the evidence bears a 
"striking resemblance" to the ex parte examinations used without confrontation at 
common law. In addition, when the primary purpose of the hearsay statement was to 
establish a fact necessary to convict a criminal defendant, evidence is testimonial and 
subject to Confrontation Clause protection. 
The affidavits in this case are testimonial since the trooper prepared them for use 
in DUI trials in order to prove facts necessary for conviction. The officer knew the 
affidavits would be used in trials when he prepared them, they were intended as a 
substitute for his live testimony, the trooper bore his testimony through the affidavits, and 
the affidavits bear a "striking resemblance" to ex parte examinations the Framers 
intended to do away with in adopting the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause. 
Utah case law further demonstrates that affidavits such as these must be subjected 
to cross-examination in order to ensure their reliability. The trooper makes subjective 
assessments in conducting the tests and is a law enforcement officer conducting the 
testing in order to prosecute individuals. According to Utah case law, under these 
circumstances a defendant's right to confrontation would be violated if the affidavits 
were admitted without allowing cross-examination. 
Because Utah's statute allows the use of affidavits such as these, the statute 
offends the Sixth Amendment. In addition, the trooper who conducted the test, not a 
substitute, must be available to meet confrontation concerns. Allowing the use of breath 
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test affidavits or a substitute expert without giving a defendant the opportunity to cross-
examine violates the Sixth Amendment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. ADMISSION OF THE INTOXILYZER AFFIDAVITS OR 
SUBSTITUTE TESTIMONY VIOLATES MR. GEORGE'S SIXTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION SINCE THE EVIDENCE 
IS TESTIMONIAL, THE WITNESS WHO CONDUCTED THE TESTS IS 
UNAVAILABLE AND MR. GEORGE HAS NOT HAD A PRIOR 
OPPORTUNITY TO CROSS-EXAMINE THE WITNESS 
The trial court erred in concluding that the affidavits prepared by Trooper 
Camacho for use at trial could be admitted without violating the Sixth Amendment. 
Admission of testimonial evidence at trial when the witness is not available and the 
defendant has not had a prior opportunity to cross-examine violates the Sixth Amendment 
right to confrontation. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). Since the 
intoxilyzer affidavits the City seeks to admit in this case are testimonial in nature, and the 
officer is unavailable to testify and Mr. George has not had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine him, the admission of the affidavits violates Mr. George's constitutional right to 
confrontation. IdL In addition, Utah Code Ann. §41-6a-515, which allows the admission 
of such affidavits in lieu of testimony, violates the Sixth Amendment since it allows 
testimonial hearsay evidence when a witness is unavailable and has not been cross-
examined by the defendant. Moreover, any attempt by the City to admit this evidence 
through a substitute expert or under a hearsay exception fails because the evidence is not 
admissible under a hearsay exception and even if it were, it would nevertheless violate 
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the Sixth Amendment since the witness who performed the tests is not available and Mr. 
George has not had a prior opportunity to confront him. 
In order to introduce intoxilyzer results at trial, the state must lay the proper 
foundation to establish the reliability of the results. See State v. Vialpando, 2004 UT 
App 95,1fl4, 89 P.3d 209 (citing State v. Baker, 355 P.2d 806, 809-10 (Wash. I960)). 
Utah has adopted the Baker test for establishing the reliability of breath test results which 
requires that the state establish, among other things, that "the intoxilyzer machine had 
been properly checked by a trained technician, and that the machine was in proper 
working condition at the time of the test." Vialpando, 2004 UT App 95, [^14. 
Historically, the state has established that the intoxilyzer machine was "properly checked 
by a trained technician" and in proper working order by submitting affidavits from the 
technician indicating that the machine was tested and working properly both before and 
after the date of the charged crime. See Murray City v. Hall 663 P.2d 1314, 1319-21 
(Utah 1983); Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-515 (2005); former Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-44.3. 
Utah Code Ann. 41-6a-515 (and its predecessor, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.3) 
explicitly allows the use of affidavits to establish foundation for admission of the 
intoxilyzer test results. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-515 states in part: 
(1) The commissioner of the department shall establish standards for the 
administration and interpretation of chemical analysis of a person's breath or 
oral fluids, including standards of training. 
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that a person was 
operating or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol or any drug or operating with a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily 
prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or records of acts, conditions or 
events to prove that the analysis was made and the instrument used was accurate, 
according to standards established in Subsection (1), are admissible if: 
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(a) the judge finds that they were made in the regular course of the 
investigation at or about the time of the act, condition or event; and 
(b) the source of the information from which made and the method and 
circumstances of their preparation indicate their trustworthiness. 
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under subsection (1) and the 
conditions of Subsection (2) have been met, there is a presumption that the test 
results are valid and further foundation for introduction of the evidence is 
unnecessary. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-515. 
In Murray City v. Hall decided prior to Crawford, the Utah Supreme Court 
considered whether Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.33, the predecessor to section 41-6a-5151, 
violated the right to confrontation by allowing an officer's affidavit to be used in lieu of 
testimony. The Court concluded that the statute did not violate the right to confrontation 
because the findings necessary under the statute ensured the reliability of the hearsay 
evidence. Hall, 663 P.2d at 1319. In addition, our supreme court reasoned that the right 
to confrontation is not absolute and must give way to legitimate governmental interests. 
Id. at 1322. Moreover, the Court pointed out that because the defendant has the ability to 
subpoena the officer who tested the machine, use of the officer's affidavits did not violate 
the right to confrontation. Id 
The trial court noted that while Hall might appear to resolve the issue, two 
problems preclude that decision from controlling the outcome in this case. R. 85. First, 
the decision in Hall was premised in part on the Court's recognition that in cases where 
the defendant wanted to question the officer, the accused could subpoena the officer to 
testify at trial. R. 85; see Hall 663 P.2d at 1322. Because Trooper Camacho is not 
1
 Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.3 contained language substantially similar to that of the 
current Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-515. 
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available, Mr. George cannot subpoena him in this case. Second, and more critically, 
"Hall was decided prior to the seminal case of Crawford v. Washington." R. 85. Since 
the Utah Supreme Court in Hall focused on the reliability of the evidence in reaching its 
decision and the United States Supreme Court subsequently rejected such an approach in 
Crawford, instead mandating that an accused be able to confront when the state seeks to 
admit testimonial evidence, the trial court correctly recognized that Crawford precludes 
Hall from controlling the decision in this case. Crawford, 541 U.S. 36; see also Hall, 663 
P.2d at 1319-21. 
As the trial court also correctly recognized, this case requires a determination of 
whether an officer's affidavit can be used in lieu of testimony without violating the Sixth 
Amendment when (1) the officer is not available and therefore cannot be subpoenaed, (2) 
Crawford has now made it clear that testimonial statements are admissible at trial only 
when the declarant is unavailable and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine, and (3) Mr. George has not had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the officer. 
R. 86. Although the trial court correctly recognized that Hall did not control the 
resolution of this case because the officer was not available to be subpoenaed and 
Crawford fundamentally altered Confrontation Clause analysis, that court incorrectly 
concluded that the affidavits encapsulating the officer's testimony were not testimonial 
and therefore did not require Confrontation Clause protection. See R. 85-89. 
Although affidavits could be used in the past to establish that an intoxilyzer 
machine was tested and properly working when the test was administered to a defendant, 
the United States Supreme Court decision in Crawford now precludes the use of such 
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affidavits. Indeed, Crawford holds that testimonial hearsay cannot be admitted without 
violating the Confrontation Clause when the witness is not available and the defendant 
has not had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness, regardless of whether the 
evidence is reliable. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63, 68. Because the affidavits the state seeks 
to use against Mr. George are testimonial in nature, the trial court erred in concluding that 
the state could use the affidavits to establish the reliability of the breath test results. 
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides, "In 
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him." U.S. Const. Amend. VI. In Crawford, the Supreme Court 
discarded its prior willingness to analyze confrontation claims based on the reliability of 
the evidence and instead required that the explicit protection set forth in the 
Confrontation Clause apply when the state seeks to use testimonial evidence against an 
accused. 541 U.S. 36, 63, 68. 
While the Court "[left] for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive 
definition of'testimonial/55 it made clear that the definition of "testimonial55 is guided by 
the historical purposes of the Confrontation Clause and the evils at which it was directed. 
Id. at 68. At the very least, "prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, 
or at a former trial; and [ ] police interrogations55 involve "testimonial55 hearsay. Id. at 
43-50, 68. The historical evil at which the Confrontation Clause was principally directed, 
"the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte 
examinations as evidence against the accused55 also qualifies as testimonial. Id. at 50. 
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This means that the state's attempts to use ex parte examinations against a defendant in a 
criminal trial violate the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 51. 
While not all hearsay is testimonial so as to require exclusion when a person who 
has not been cross-examined is not available, the Confrontation Clause does apply to 
witnesses who bear testimony. IdL at 51. And testimony typically consists of "'[a] 
solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some 
fact5" Id. (quoting 2 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 
(1828)). Formal statements to government officials qualify as testimonial, and the text 
and history of the Clause "reflect[ ] an especially acute concern with a specific type of 
out-of-court statement" which includes, among other things, ex parte testimony in the 
form of affidavits and statements "which would lead an objective witness reasonably to 
believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial." Id. at 51-2. 
The confrontation protection applies to this "core class of 'testimonial' 
statements" and requires that such statements be excluded from evidence at trial when the 
witness is unavailable unless the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine. 
Id 
Various formulations of this core class of "testimonial" statements exist: "ex parte 
in-court testimony or its functional equivalent - that is, material such as affidavits, 
custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-
examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to 
be used prosecutorially," [citation omitted] "extra-judicial statements . . . 
contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior 
testimony, or confessions." White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365, 112 S.Ct. 736, 
116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992)(THOMAS, J., joined by SCALIA, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in judgment); "statements that were made under circumstances 
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement 
would be available for use at a later trial[.]" [citation omitted]. 
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Id. Hence, while Crawford did not provide a comprehensive definition for "testimonial" 
evidence, it nevertheless provided guidance in assessing whether evidence is testimonial, 
and directed that certain evidence, including ex parte affidavits made in anticipation of 
litigation, is not admissible when the witness is unavailable. 
Following Crawford, the United States Supreme Court revisited the question of 
what constitutes'"testimonial" hearsay so as to mandate the protection of the 
Confrontation Clause. See Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006). In Davis, the 
issue was whether a "recording of a 911 call qualifies" as testimonial hearsay, requiring 
its exclusion when the witness is unavailable. IdL at 2274. The Court adopted a 
"primary purpose" test, holding that statements are not testimonial "under circumstances 
objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police 
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency." Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2273. On the other hand, 
statements "are testimonial when circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such 
ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or 
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution." Id at 2273-74. 
Accordingly, a 911 call is not testimonial where the primary purpose of the questioning is 
to aid an ongoing emergency. 
By contrast, when there is no ongoing emergency and the primary purpose of the 
statement is to establish that a person committed a crime, the hearsay is testimonial and 
protected by the Sixth Amendment. In Hammon v. Washington, the companion case to 
Davis, the Court concluded that hearsay statements of the defendant's wife, which were 
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taken to investigate a possible crime after it had occurred, were testimonial hearsay. 
Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2278. The Court determined that the statements bore a "striking 
resemblance" to ex parte examinations since the defendant was not able to participate in 
the examination of the witness and "[s]uch statements under official interrogation are an 
obvious substitute for live testimony, because they do precisely what a witness does on 
direct examination; they are inherently testimonial." Id. at 2278 (emphasis in original). 
In addition to utilizing the primary purpose test for assessing whether statements 
are testimonial, the Court in Davis also clarified that any statement, not just those 
resulting from interrogation, might qualify as testimonial. Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2274 n. 1. 
As the Court explained, the Framers included voluntary testimony as well as testimony 
brought about by questioning, within the Sixth Amendment confrontation protection. Id. 
This Court addressed the definition of "testimonial" for Sixth Amendment 
purposes in Salt Lake City v. Williams, 2005 UT App 493, 128 P.3d 47. In that case, the 
prosecution presented a victim's hearsay statements that were made during an ongoing 
crime. Id. at [^8. This Court held the statements were not testimonial, reasoning that 
when the victim made the statements she was not responding to a police inquiry and "was 
not providing the information for use in a prosecution or investigation," and instead, her 
statement was "simply a factual statement made in surprise when she first noticed [the 
defendant]." Id. at \\9. Because the statement "'[bore] little resemblance to the civil-law 
abuses the Confrontation Clause targeted,5" this Court held that its admission did not 
violate the right to confrontation. Id . (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51). 
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Moreover, some of the victim's statements in Williams could be heard on the 911 
call made as part of the incident. IdL at IflpO, 21. This Court reasoned that the victim 
could reasonably have expected that her statement would be heard by the 911 operator 
and employed analysis similar to that subsequently used by the Supreme Court in Davis 
to conclude that the 911 statement in that case was part of an ongoing event and a "cry 
for help" rather than "an attempt to investigate or prosecute a crime against a defendant." 
Id. at ^[22. Because the statements overheard on the 911 call were a "cry for help" rather 
than aimed at prosecuting a crime, the hearsay was not testimonial in Williams. Id. at 24. 
Courts have held that breath test affidavits similar to those in this case are 
"testimonial" and therefore inadmissible if the affiant is unavailable and the defendant 
has not had a prior opportunity to cross-examine. See e ^ Martin v. State, 936 So.2d 
1190, 1192 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 2006); Shiver v. State, 900 So.2d 615 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App.App. 2005). While some courts have held that breath test affidavits are not 
testimonial, in circumstances similar to the current case where the affidavit was prepared 
by law enforcement to be used for prosecution, the better reasoned decisions have 
concluded that breath test affidavits prepared for prosecution are testimonial and subject 
to Sixth Amendment protection. See State v. Campbell 719 N.W.2d 374, 377 n.l (N.D. 
2006) (recognizing the split in authority and citing cases that have been decided both 
ways). In fact, these better reasoned decisions are consistent with Crawford and Davis 
which require that affidavits such as those in the present case which are prepared to be 
used against accused persons in criminal prosecutions are testimonial in nature and 
subject to confrontation. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-2 {exparte affidavits against an 
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accused are testimonial when "an objective witness [would] reasonably [ ] believe that 
the statement would be available for use at a later trial"); Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74 
(statements that did not have a primary purpose of obtaining emergency aid and which 
are intended as a substitute for live testimony, to be used in lieu of a witness, are 
testimonial in nature); see also Williams, 2005 UT App 493, <|Jf20-22 (statements made 
for the purposes of prosecuting a crime are testimonial). 
Shiver is consistent with Crawford and Davis in reasoning that when a declarant is 
reasonably certain that a statement will be used to prosecute, that statement is testimonial 
and requires Confrontation Clause protection. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-2; Shiver, 900 
So.2d at 618. The court held in Shiver that a breath test affidavit was testimonial since 
"[i]t contained statements one would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially, and 
was made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness to reasonably 
believe the statements would be available for trial. In fact, the only reason the affidavit 
was prepared was for admission at trial." Shiver, 900 So.2d at 618; see also Martin, 936 
So.2d at 1192 (breath test affidavit was testimonial since it was prepared by law 
enforcement for trial and used against defendant in a criminal prosecution); Crawford, 
541 U.S. at 51-2 (formal statements by witnesses that "declarants could reasonably 
expect to be used prosecutorially" are testimonial). 
Because the Sixth Amendment provides "'a procedural rather than a substantive 
guarantee' and 'commands, not that the evidence be reliable, but that reliability be 
assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination,'" 
admission of a breath test affidavit violates the Sixth Amendment. Shiver, 900 So.2d at 
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618 (quoting Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1370). As the Shiver court recognized, a breath test 
affidavit "contain[s] testimonial evidence regarding when the statutorily required 
maintenance of the instrument was performed. This information was crucial, because the 
admissibility of Appellant's breath test results were dependent upon the instrument 
having met the statutory requirements which, in turn, was dependent upon timely and 
proper maintenance." Id. at 618. Since the defendant was unable to cross-examine the 
officer who maintained the machine, his right to confrontation was violated. Id. 
Belvin v. State, 922 So.2d 1046, 1050-51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) also followed 
Crawford in holding that breath test affidavits are testimonial in nature and their 
admission violates the Sixth Amendment. Although a statute allowed the use of 
affidavits prepared by officers who maintained the machine, the Court reasoned that the 
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation trumped the statute since the affidavits were 
"usually generated by law enforcement for use at a later criminal trial or driver's license 
revocation proceeding." Id at 1050. Because the affidavits were therefore "'statements 
that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to 
believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial,'" the Belvin court 
concluded they were testimonial and entitled to Sixth Amendment protection. See id. 
(citation omitted). 
The affidavits in this case are testimonial in nature and subject to Confrontation 
Clause protection since they were prepared for use in prosecution. The affidavits 
themselves recognize that they were prepared for use at trial since they indicate that the 
trooper is competent to testify. In addition, Utah Code Ann. §41-6a-515 plainly 
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recognizes that the affidavits are prepared for use in prosecution, stating that the 
affidavits may be used "[i]n any action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that 
a person was operating or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence 
. . . ." Utah Code Ann. §41-6a-515(2). The statute further acknowledges that the 
affidavits are prepared for use in prosecution rather than for routine record keeping 
purposes when it uses the word "prove," discusses admissibility, refers to the 
trustworthiness of the affidavits, and relies on the judge's findings in two different places. 
Id. Because an "objective witness [would] reasonably believe that the statement would 
be available for use at a later trial," (Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-2), the affidavits are 
testimonial. See Shiver, 900 So.2d at 618. 
In addition, the trooper's affidavits were intended as a substitute for live 
testimony, thereby demonstrating that the affidavits are testimonial. See Davis, 126 
S.Ct. at 2273-74. The trooper intended to bear his testimony through affidavits, and the 
affidavits were prepared for the purpose of proving the necessary and important 
foundational fact of whether the intoxilyzer was working properly. See Crawford, 541 
U.S. at 51. The affidavits were prepared by law enforcement personnel for use in 
prosecution, further undermining their reliability and further demonstrating that they are 
testimonial. See State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 1181, 1184-87 (Utah 1983) (affidavits prepared 
by police for prosecution are generally not considered reliable when offered by the state). 
And, the affidavits bear a "striking resemblance" to ex parte examinations, whose use at 
trial the Confrontation Clause seeks to eradicate. See Davis, 126 S.Ct, at 2278; 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52. Pursuant to Crawford and Davis, the affidavits are testimonial 
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because they were prepared by law enforcement personnel for use in prosecution, and the 
primary purpose for the affidavits was not to obtain emergency aid, or even routine 
bookkeeping, but instead to prosecute individuals for DUI crimes. See Crawford, 541 
U.S. 36; Davis, 126 S.Ct. 2266. 
Concluding that breath test affidavits prepared for the purposes of prosecution are 
testimonial follows the mandates of Crawford and Davis while also ensuring that criminal 
defendants have an opportunity to cross-examine to test the trustworthiness of the 
information contained in the affidavits. This is not merely a mechanical protection; 
instead, requiring cross-examination encourages officers to thoroughly and accurately 
conduct the testing and protects the integrity of the criminal justice system by testing the 
reliability and accuracy of the testing procedures through cross-examination. 
Cross-examination of Trooper Camacho in this case would not be merely 
mechanical or theoretical and instead would further the truth-seeking process and protect 
the integrity of Utah courts. Subjecting officers who maintain the intoxilyzer machines 
and who attest that machines were working properly so as to prosecute an individual to 
cross-examination will aid the truth-seeking function of criminal trials by encouraging 
officers to carefully conduct the testing procedures while also avoiding false convictions 
based on incorrect breath test results. In addition, without discussing at length the 
numerous questions defense counsel might have for Trooper Camacho regarding the 
maintenance and testing of the intoxilyzer, the affidavits themselves give rise to a 
multitude of questions as to how the maintenance and testing were conducted. For 
example, as the affidavits demonstrate, the trooper checks the machine by running three 
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tests with a "known" sample. Where did the sample come from? Did the trooper mix it? 
How does he know the sample was accurate? Did he use the intoxilyzer to test the 
sample's accuracy? Cross-examination of the trooper would necessarily include 
questions as to what kind of sample was used, how it was mixed, and whether it was 
properly compounded. 
Other aspects of the trooper's testing which require cross-examination are also 
evident in the affidavit. In conducting the test, the trooper must make sure that the air 
pump works and also run the air pump for twelve to fifteen seconds. How long the 
trooper waited, whether other people were present or he was distracted by other things, 
whether an invalid test was run, what temperature the trooper read and a variety of other 
details that require questioning are evident from the affidavit. In the end, the trooper's 
statement that the tests were made, the proper procedure was followed, and the machine 
was working properly are conclusory statements that should be subjected to cross-
examination to ensure their reliability. 
In addition, the recognition by Utah appellate courts of the unreliability of 
documents prepared by law enforcement personnel for use in prosecution further 
demonstrates the need for cross-examination of the officer who maintains and tests the 
intoxilyzer machine. See Bertul 664 P.2d at 1184-85; Layton City v. Peronek, 803 P.2d 
1294, 1297 (Utah App. 1990). In Bertul the Court recognized that documents prepared 
"with an eye toward litigation" are generally not considered reliable "when offered by the 
party responsible for making the record." Bertul 664 P.2d at 1185 (citation omitted). 
When reports are made in contemplation of litigation, they "are generally made for the 
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purpose of successfully prosecuting a crime, the reasons which might otherwise provide a 
basis to assume reliability of such reports as business records do not exist where police 
reports are offered by the prosecution in a criminal proceeding." Id. at 1184. The Court 
recognized that while such "reports may not be readily describable as 'dripping with 
motivation to misrepresent/" cross-examination is required "when the information in the 
report calls into question the motivation and the accuracy of the perception, recall, 
manner of language usage, or the soundness of the conclusions of the author of the 
report." Id at 1185. Hence, when the prosecution offers a report prepared by officers in 
anticipation of litigation, the report is not considered to be sufficiently reliable to be 
admissible under the business records exception. Id.; see also, Peronek, 803 P.2d at 
1297-98 (incident report prepared by officer "with intent to submit it to the court for 
'prosecution' of a probation violation" was not sufficiently reliable to be admissible 
under the business records exception for hearsay evidence). Because these affidavits 
were prepared by a highway patrolman for use as evidence in DUI prosecutions, their 
reliability is undermined so as to make them inadmissible.2 
Our Supreme Court has also emphasized the need for confrontation in 
circumstances where, as is the case here, a state employee conducts testing that has a 
Regardless of whether the affidavits qualify for admission under a hearsay exception, 
they are inadmissible because they are testimonial and it would violate Mr. George's 
right to confrontation to admit them. See State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 479-80 (Utah 
1990) (even if evidence is admissible under a hearsay exception, admission may violate 
the right to confrontation). Nevertheless, while admission of the affidavits in this case 
violates the Sixth Amendment, the affidavits are also inadmissible under a hearsay 
exception pursuant to Bertul and the language of the business records hearsay exception 
which excludes "in criminal cases, matters observed by police officers and other law 
enforcement personnel... ." Rule 806(8)(B), Utah Rules of Evidence. 
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subjective component. See State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, 122 P.3d 639. In Workman, 
the Court addressed the issue of whether toxicology reports prepared at the state crime 
lab could be introduced under the residual hearsay exception when the witness who 
prepared the reports was not available to testify. Id. at TH17-22. In concluding that the 
reports were not admissible under the residual hearsay exception, the court recognized 
'"[s]imply because [hearsay] might be admissible under a hearsay exception does not 
mean that those statements automatically pass constitutional muster. If the evidence 
violates a defendant's right to confront witnesses, it should not be admitted.'" Id. at ^ |17 
(quoting Moosman, 794 P.2d at 479-80) (alterations in original). Admission of the 
toxicology reports in absence of the witness who prepared them deprived Workman of 
her right to confrontation and precluded admission under the residual hearsay exception 
because there was "a significant subjective element involved in the testing at issue, 
including a criminologist determining the results of the color tests and comparing the 
spectra from the gas chromatograph mass spectrometer test with the spectra from known 
substances." Id 
As in Workman, there is a subjective aspect to the testing in this case. The trooper 
must create or obtain a sample solution and run it through the machine after determining 
that the air pump works and running the pump an appropriate amount of time; the trooper 
must also conduct a number of other checks or verifications and determine whether the 
simulator solution was properly compounded. Since these steps require accuracy and 
subjective assessments, cross-examination is necessary to ensure the reliability of the 
trooper's testimony and conclusions. 
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Workman also demonstrates that the state cannot use a substitute witness to testify 
regarding the details of Trooper Camacho's testing without offending the Sixth 
Amendment. Workman, 2005 UT 66, ^ 19-22. Pursuant to Workman, substitute experts 
cannot be used when the testing at issue contains subjective, non-routine or detailed 
aspects, i.e. when cross-examination of the witness who conducted the testing is 
necessary to determine its reliability. Id. (citing Kofford v. Flora, 744 P.2d 1343, 1356 
(Utah 1987); Moosman, 794 P.2d at 479-80). This is consistent with Crawford which 
precludes the use of testimonial evidence unless the declarant can be cross-examined. 
See Crawford, 541 U.S. 36. Since Trooper Winward was not involved in the testing and 
is not certified to conduct the testing (R. 44-5), and the conclusion as to whether the 
machine was working properly involves a subjective determination, the state cannot use a 
substitute witness to present Trooper Camacho's testimony. 
Workman and Bertul demonstrate that an affidavit prepared by a police officer for 
use in prosecution is not sufficiently reliable to allow its admission under a hearsay 
exception. These cases are consistent with Crawford and Davis in that they demonstrate 
the need for cross-examination when the state seeks to use affidavits as testimonial 
evidence to establish that an intoxilyzer was properly maintained and tested. In addition, 
Workman clarifies that any testimonial hearsay, whether introduced through an affidavit 
or substitute witness, violates the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. 
3
 As Mr. George pointed out below, Utah Admin. Rule 714-500 requires, among other 
things, that "[ojnly certified breath alcohol testing technicians . . . shall be authorized to 
provide expert testimony concerning the certification and all other aspects of the breath 
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Despite the fact that Crawford and Davis require confrontation since the affidavits 
were prepared for prosecution, the trial court incorrectly concluded that the affidavits 
were not testimonial. R. 89. While the trial court acknowledged that the affidavits were 
being used in lieu of testimony (R. 89), it relied primarily on State v. Norman, 125 P.3d 
15 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) to reach its incorrect conclusion that the affidavits in this case 
were not testimonial. R. 86-7. The Oregon court of appeals decided in Norman that the 
breath test affidavits in that case were not testimonial because (1) they were not prepared 
for use in a specific case to convict a specific defendant, (2) the technicians were not 
operating as part of a police investigation, and (3) the affidavits would have been 
admissible under a hearsay exception at common law and therefore did not implicate 
confrontation clause concerns. Norman, 125 P.3d at 18-19. 
The Norman rationale is not persuasive in Utah, however, because the affidavits 
the state seeks to use in this case were prepared for use in prosecution and would not 
have been admissible at common law under a business records hearsay exception. See 
Bertul, 664 P.2d at 1184-85; Utah Code Ann. §41-6a-515. In fact, while the affidavits 
were not prepared for a specific case, they were prepared for use at trial, making them 
testimonial. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-2. In addition, the language of the statute 
plainly requires that the affidavit be "made in the regular course of the investigation" 
(Utah Code Ann. §41-6a-515(emphasis added)); hence, unlike the affidavits in Norman, 
the trooper in this case was operating as part of the police investigation. Moreover, as 
testing instrument under his/her supervision.," and Trooper Winward, the state's apparent 
substitute, does not fit these criteria. R. 44-5. 
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outlined above, the affidavits in this case would not be admissible in Utah since the tests 
were performed by law enforcement for use at trial and cross-examination is therefore 
necessary to ensure the reliability of the evidence. 
Although the trial court determined that the affidavits were not testimonial 
because they were prepared for general usage against all DUI defendants and were not 
specifically prepared for use in George's trial, Crawford and Davis do not make such a 
distinction in determining whether hearsay is testimonial. Instead Crawford and Davis 
require that a criminal defendant be allowed to confront witnesses against him and direct 
that hearsay is testimonial and subject to Confrontation Clause protection when the 
witness is reasonably certain that the statement will be used at trial. Crawford, 541 U.S. 
at 50-2; Davis, 126 S.Ct. 2266. The affidavits the state seeks to use in this case are 
testimonial since Trooper Camacho made affirmative statements for the purpose of 
proving facts against defendants in criminal trials, the affidavits bear a "striking 
resemblance" to ex parte examinations, and the primary purpose for the affidavits is for 
prosecution. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52; Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2278. Moreover, because the 
affidavits were prepared by law enforcement knowing they would be used to prosecute 
persons charged with a crime, the reliability of the affidavits is undermined and cross-
examination is essential. See e ^ Bertul, 664 P.2d at 1184-85; see also Crawford, 541 
U.S. at 50-2 (statements are testimonial and require confrontation if declarant knew they 
may be used at trial). 
As a final matter, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-515, which allows the use of 
testimonial affidavits to prove that an intoxilyzer machine was operating properly, 
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violates the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. Although statutes are presumed to 
be constitutional and the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute ucbear[s] the 
burden of demonstrating its unconstitutionality'" (Green, 2004 UT 76, [^42 (further 
citation omitted)), section 41-6a-515's authorization of the use of testimonial hearsay in 
the absence of cross-examination violates the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation as 
outlined in Crawford and Davis; see discussion supra. 
The trial court erred in concluding that the trooper's affidavits were not 
testimonial and could be used as evidence against Mr. George at his DUI trial. The 
trooper prepared the affidavits for use at a criminal trial to help establish guilt. Because 
the affidavits encapsulated the trooper's testimony without affording Mr. George the 
opportunity to cross-examine, admission of the affidavits violates the Sixth Amendment. 
In addition, while Utah Code Ann. §41-6a-515 allows the use of hearsay affidavits to 
prove at a DUI trial that the intoxilyzer machine was working properly, that statute 
violates the Sixth Amendment since it permits the use of testimonial hearsay without the 
opportunity for cross-examination. Moreover, use of a substitute witness who did not 
conduct the tests would not afford Mr. George his constitutional right to confrontation. 
Accordingly, the trial court's order should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant/Defendant Frederick Thomas George, by and through counsel, 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trials court's order and instead, hold that 
admission of the breath test affidavits would violate the Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
FREDERICK GEORGE, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 055900090 
Judge Robin W. Reese 
Date: June 7, 2 0 06 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion in Limine. 
Having considered the memoranda submitted by the parties,1 the Court 
enters the following decision and finds that Defendant's Motion should 
be DENIED. 
At issue here are two Certificates of Calibration of Intoxilyzer 
5000/8000 prepared by Trooper Byron Camacho. It is undisputed that 
Trooper Camacho is currently out of the country and is unavailable to 
testify that he performed the checks on the breath testing instrument at 
issue here. Therefore, the State would like to admit the 
Certificates/Affidavits completed by Trooper Camacho in lieu of his 
testimony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-515. Section 41-6a-515 
provides: 
(1) The commissioner of the department shall establish 
standards for the administration and interpretation of 
chemical analysis of a person's breath or oral fluids, 
including standards of training. 
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to 
prove that a person was operating or in actual physical 
control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or 
any drug or operating with a blood or breath alcohol content 
statutorily prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or 
records of acts, conditions, or events to prove that the 
analysis was made and the instrument used was accurate, 
according to standards established in Subsection (1) , are 
admissible if: 
1
 The Court would like to note that counsel for both the defense and for the City provided 
well-written and well-researched memoranda, significantly easing the Court's burden in reaching 
this decision. 
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(a) the judge finds that they were made in the regular course 
of the investigation at or about the time of the act, 
condition, or event; and 
(b) the source of information from which made and the method 
and circumstances of their preparation indicate their trustworthiness. 
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under 
Subsection (1) and the conditions of Subsection (2) have been 
met, there is a presumption that the test results are valid 
and further foundation for introduction of the evidence is unnecessary. 
Defendant does not argue that the Certificates/Affidavits Trooper 
Camacho prepared do not comport with the requirements of § 41-6a-515.2 
Rather, Defendant asserts that Section 41-6a-515 and the admission of 
the Certifications violates the Confrontation Clause because Defendant 
will not be allowed to examine Trooper Camacho. 
At the outset, the Court notes that Murray City v. Hall, 663 P. 2d 
1314 (Utah 1983) appears to resolve this issue. In Hall, the court held 
that: 
given the (1) legitimate governmental interest in not having 
to produce in every DUI case the public officer responsible 
for testing the accuracy of the breathalyzer and the ampoules, 
and (2) the alternative means available to an accused to 
cross-examine and confront such a witness, we hold that § 41-
6-44.3 [the previous version of Section 41-6a-515] does not 
violate the appellant's constitutional right of confrontation 
when all of its requirements are met. 
Id. at 1322. However, Hall raises two problems which limit this Court's 
ability to rely on the decision. First, Hall specifically stated that 
if an accused wants to question the public officer responsible for 
testing the breathalyzer, the accused has the right to subpoena the 
officer. In the present case, Trooper Camacho's unavailability means 
that Defendant cannot subpoena him. Second, Hall was decided prior to 
the seminal case of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 
158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) . Therefore, the Court must determine whether the 
affidavits can be admitted even though Defendant cannot call Camacho to 
*
 2
 Although no argument was raised on this point, the Court finds that the 
Pa^i'^onfap/ A PfiHaA/itc xrf* in r.nmnliance with Section 41-6a-515. 
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testify and whether Crawford overruled Hall. 
In Crawford, the U.S. Supreme Court held that " [t]estimonial 
statements of witnesses absent from trial [are admissible] only where 
the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a 
prior opportunity to cross-examine." 541 U.S. at 59. This overruled 
the previous test from Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) which held 
that hearsay statements were admissible if they bore "adequate indicia 
of reliability." The court in Crawford found that "unpardonable vice" 
of the "reliability" test was that it admitted "core testimonial 
statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude." 541 
U.S. at 63 (emphasis in original). Crawford said that the Sixth 
Amendment intended to only admit those exceptions that existed at the 
time of its founding. Id. at 54. At that time " [m] ost of the hearsay 
exceptions covered statements that by their nature were not testimonial 
- for example, business records or statements in furtherance of a 
conspiracy." Id. at 56. 
It is undisputed in the present case that, while the declarant 
(Trooper Camacho) is unavailable, Defendant did not have the opportunity 
to cross examine him. Therefore, according to Crawford, Camacho's 
affidavits violate the Confrontation Clause if they are "testimonial." 
The Court is persuaded that Camacho's affidavits are non-
testimonial. Crawford specifically leaves "for another day any effort 
to spell out a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial.'" Id. at 68. 
However, a number of jurisdictions have recently addressed this same 
issue and it appears that the majority of have found that Intoxilyzer 
certifications are not testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation 
Clause. See, e.g., Bohsancurt v. Honorable Eisenberg, 129 P. 3d 471 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2006); Rackoff v. State, 621 S.E.2d 841 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2005); Napier v. State, 827 N.E.2d 565 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); State v. 
Norman, 125 P. 3d 15 (Or. Ct. App. 2005); Luginbyhl v. Commonwealth, 618 
S.E.2d 347 (Va. Ct. App. 2005). 
In particular, Oregon held in Norman that Crawford and State v. 
Mack, 101 P. 3d 349 (Ore. 2004) set the "parameters for determining 
whether evidence is 'testimonial in nature' under the Sixth Amendment" 
and those parameters are not satisfied by Intoxilyzer certifications. 
125 P.3d at 18. First, the certifications are not intended to be used 
to convict a particular defendant of a crime but are evidence of the 
accuracy of a test result arrived at by a machine. Evidence of the 
accuracy of a test result does not implicate the methodology of police 
or prosecutorial examinations of potential witnesses, as the 
Confrontation Clause is concerned about Id. Second, the technicians 
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were not acting as proxy for the police in their investigative 
functions, they were merely ensuring that the machines operated properly 
and provided accurate results. "Unlike police or prosecutorial 
interrogators, the technicians have not demonstrable interest in whether 
the certifications produce evidence that is favorable or adverse to a 
particular defendant." Id. at 18-19. Finally, exceptions for admission 
of Intoxilyzer certifications parallel the historical hearsay exceptions 
that were deemed non-testimonial, particularly the business records 
exception. Id. at 19. 
The Court is persuaded by Norman, et. al. that Crawford would not 
change the result in Hall because § 41-6a-515 only admits 
Certifications which are non-testimonial because they were not prepared 
to be used against a particular defendant, they are not based on 
subjective factors such as police interrogation methods, and Section 41-
6a-515 is derived from the historical business records hearsay 
exception.3 Additionally, the Court finds that this holding resolves the 
other problem with Hall, that it indicated that the State had not 
violated the Confrontation Clause because the defendant could call the 
technician to testify. Because the Certifications are non-testimonial, 
Defendant's Sixth Amendment rights are not violated even though he 
cannot call Trooper Camacho to testify. 
Defendant relies on a number a number of cases from other 
jurisdictions which found "breath test affidavits" inadmissible. 
However, Defendant's reliance is misplaced. Specifically, Defendant 
relies on People v. Rogers, 780 N.Y.S.2d 393, 8 A.D.3d 888 (2004) and 
Shiver v. State, 900 So. 2d 615 (Fla. Ct. App. 2005) . The Court is 
persuaded by Bohsancurt's specific distinction of those cases. 
Bohsancurt held that Rogers was distinguishable because uit held that . 
laboratory reports are testimonial, [but such] reports [are] 
inculpatory in a way that calibration and maintenance records are not. 
. . . In contrast to the types of reports involved in [Rogers] , the 
recorded results of calibration testing in the abstract do not relate to 
any specific defendant or particular case." 129 P. 3d at 478. 
Bohsancurt also distinguished Shiver by saying, 
[a]lthough at first blush it appears Shiver dealt with records 
similar to Arizona's QARs. The Florida records actually 
included breath-test results of the individual defendant in 
3
 The City argues that, if Section 41-6a-515 is invalidated, the Certifications/Affidavits 
are also admissible under the business records exception. The Court does not reach this issue 
hpnmise it finds that Section 41-6a-515 is constitutional. 
SLC V. GEORGE PAGE 5 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
addition to a section in which the officer who conducted the 
breath-test had certified that another officer had calibrated 
and checked the machine. Those facts are clearly 
distinguishable from those presented here. 
Id. at 478 n.6. The Court finds that the other cases cited by Defendant 
are clearly distinguishable for the same reasons offered to distinguish 
Rogers. 
Defendant also relies heavily on State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, 122 
P. 3d 63 9. In Workman, Christine Wright of the Utah State Crime 
Laboratory personally took samples of substances, etc. from a home where 
officers had served a search warrant. Wright then analyzed the samples 
and positively identified meth and meth precursors. Id. at % 2 . On the 
day of trial, Wright was unavailable and the State sought to have 
Wright's supervisor, Jennifer McNair, testify as a substitute witness. 
Id. at 1 5. The Utah Supreme Court found it was error to allow McNair 
to testify in place of Wright for three reasons. First, the nature of 
the testing was subjective (the tests depended "upon subjective 
inferences by the testing party, based, as McNair testified, on their 
'training and experience.' id. at f 15). Id. at ^^ 13-15. Second, 
given the nature of the tests, it would have been every difficult for 
the defendants to challenge the evidence without cross-examining those 
personally involved in the testing. Id. at f 17. Specifically, because 
of the subjective element of the testing, the defendants should have 
been allowed to ask questions about whether the testing was conducted 
properly. Id. at ^[ 17-18. Additionally, Defendant was not able to 
prepare for Wright's absence because it was only announced on the day of 
the trial. Id. at 1 18. Finally, the testing involved in this case was 
materially different from testing in other cases where the court allowed 
substitute witnesses in that the testing was not based on "promulgated, 
rigid guidelines and standards." Id. at ^| 19-20. 
It is clear to the Court that Workman is distinct from this case 
for a number of reasons. First, unlike Wright who collected evidence 
and tested it with regard to a specific case, Trooper Camacho did not 
perform the inspection in order to test a specific defendant or to aid 
in a specific prosecution. Second, there is no evidence that the 
testing done by Trooper Camacho involved any subjective elements. 
Instead, it appears that the testing is based on "promulgated, rigid 
guidelines and standards," making it more like cases where expert 
witnesses were allowed to substitute for one another. Third, because 
there was no subjective element to Trooper Camacho's testing, this is 
not the type of evidence that Defendant needs to be allowed to cross 
examine upon. Fourth, there is no special prejudice to Defendant 
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because Trooper Camacho's absence was announced well in advance of 
trial. Finally, the City does not seek to "substitute" one expert for 
another, as in Workman (and Shiver) . Instead, Camacho will still be 
"testifying," he will simply be testifying via affidavit. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Defendant's Motion 
in Limine should be DENIED and the City should be allowed to present 
Trooper Camacho's Certifications/Affidavits. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, 
to the following, on this *J day of June, 2006. 
Simarjit S. Gill 
Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office 
Bernadette M. Gomez 
Associate City Prosecutor 
349 South 200 East, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Samuel P. Newton 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
Attorney for Defendant 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Vj j 
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UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
0 0 O 0 0 
JUL - 7 2006 
Frederick George, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
Salt Lake City. 
Respondent. 
ORDER 
Case No. 20060591-CA 
FlIf-DUiXYillCTCGUAl 
' Third Judicial D»8tnet 
JUL 1 6 m 
Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Orme, "Sepyiy Lie<i< 
This case is before the court on petitioner Frederick 
George's petition for permission to appeal from an interlocutory 
order. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for permission to 
appeal is granted. The parties will be notified when a briefing 
schedule is established. 
-]£ 
DATED this r day of July, 2006. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on July 7, 2006, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail or 
placed in Interdepartmental mailing to be delivered to: 
SIMARJIT SINGH GILL 
BERNADETTE GOMEZ 
SALT LAKE CITY ATTORNEY OFFICE 
349 S 200 E STE 500 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
SAMUEL P NEWTON 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 E 500 S STE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE 
ATTN: SOPHIE ORVIN / JODI BAILEY 
450 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 1860 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860 
Dated this July 7, 2006. 
Deputy Clerk 
Case No. 20060591 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE, 055900090 
TabC 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-515 (2005) 
41-6a-515. Standards for chemical breath or oral fluids 
analysis — Evidence. 
(1) The commissioner of the department shall establish standards for the 
administration and interpretation of chemical analysis of a person's breath or 
oral fluids, including standards of training. 
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to prove tha t a person 
was operating or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol or any drug or operating with a blood or breath alcohol 
content statutorily prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or records of 
acts, conditions, or events to prove tha t the analysis was made and the 
instrument used was accurate, according to standards established in Subsec-
tion (1), are admissible if: 
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the regular course of the 
investigation at or about the t ime of the act, condition, or event; and 
(b) the source of information from which made and the method and 
circumstances of their preparation indicate their trustworthiness. 
(3) If the judge finds that the s tandards established under Subsection (1) 
and the conditions of Subsection (2) have been met, there is a presumption that 
the test results are valid and further foundation for introduction of the 
evidence is unnecessary. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.3 
41-6-44.3. Standards for chemical breath analysis — Evi-
dence. 
(1) The commissioner of the Department of Public Safety shall establish 
standards for the administration and interpretation of chemical analysis of a 
person's breath, including standards of training. 
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to prove tha t a person 
was operating or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol or any drug or operating with a blood or breath alcohol 
content statutorily prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or records of 
acts, conditions, or events to prove that the analysis was made and the 
instrument used was accurate, according to standards established in Subsec-
tion (1), are admissible if: 
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the regular course of the 
investigation at or about the time of the act, condition, or event; and 
(b) the source of information from which made and the method and 
circumstances of their preparation indicate their trustworthiness. 
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under Subsection (1) 
and the conditions of Subsection (2) have been met, there is a presumption that 
the test results are valid and further foundation for introduction of the 
evidence is unnecessary. 
U.S. Const, amend. VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
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State of Utah 
JON M HUNTSMAN, JR 
Governor 
GARY R HERBERT 
Lieu tenant Governor 
Department of Public Safety 
ROBERT L FLOWERS 
Commissioner 
CUSTODIAN CERTIFICATE 
I, the undersigned, being first duly sworn, state that: 
1. ui una 
D. 
'4. 
5. 
I am the Breathtesting Supervisor of the Utah Highway Patrol and the official keeper 
responsible for the maintenance check records of the breathtesting instruments maintained in the 
State of Utah. 
Attached are true and correct copies of the records of maintenance and certification for the 
Intoxilyzer serial number/ffi~Qfl235(0 located at * 5 L C P D ^[(SYXteJv* , 
of which are kept on file by me, in the course of official business, for the State of Utah, 
Department of Public Safety and in accordance with the current regulations of the Commissioner 
of Public Safety. 
The attached tests were done BEFORE and AFTER the date of 
Mavdk Si ,%*)<? • 
The breathtest technician(s) whose signature(s) appear on the attached affidavit(s) are certified by 
the State of Utah and has/have met all of the following requirements as required by the 
Department of Public Safety: 
a. Satisfactory completion of operator's initial certification course and/or renewal course; 
b. Satisfactory completion of the Breath Alcohol Testing Supervisor's course offered by the 
Indiana University, or an equivalent course of instruction, as approved by the Breath 
Alcohol Testing Program; 
c. Satisfactory completion of a Breath Alcohol Testing Instrument Manufacturer's 
Maintenance/Repair Technician course for the instruments in use in the State of Utah or 
is qualified by nature of his/her employment or training to maintain/repair those 
instruments; 
d. Maintain Technician's status through a minimum of eight (8) hours related training each 
calendar year. 
I am competent to testify jind have personal knowledge of the matter alleged in this affidavit. 
fscTFTTXrViuLf* 
PAUL KOTTER 
5681 South 320 West 
Murray, Utah 84107 
My Commission Expires 
April 21, 2007 
STATE OF UTAH 
~^~ 
1TATE OF UTAH
 % 
'OUNTY O F j S U _ _ 
THE rl\^r DAY OF i WH O BEING DULY SWORN BEFORE 
Sergeant Steven Winward 
Breathtesting Supervisor 
Utah Highway Patrol 
,7/0*3 , PERSONALLY APPEARED BEFORE ME, STEVEN 
; MEEXECUTED THE ABOVE REFERENCED CERTIFICATE AND I INWARD 
\RTIFY THAT SAID PERSON IS AN OFFICER AND EMPLOYEE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY OF THE 
<\TE OF UTAH AND IS THE LEGAL CUSTODIAN OF THE INTOXILYZER AFFIDAVITS OF SAID DEPARTMENT AND 
\1 HIS SIGNATURE AFFIXED HERETO IS GENUINE. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
/ 
>n Development and Technology Cenler, 5681 South 320 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
•. (801) 284-5*i00 • lacsimile (801) 284-5556 
PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT \Uahl 
I 1ATI J * 
Utah Department of Public Safety 
Certificate of Calibration 
Intoxilyzer 5000 / 8000 
I. "We the undersigned, being first duly sworn, state Thar 
1. Bream testing mstrument TNTQJj^YZEfi, serial number b<7 O O^-Zi-l 
j . 
4. 
located at 3 . d_ yores- , was properly checked 
Yes/No 
W U 
WU 
t/u 
^/n 
GU^D 
u^u 
12/U 
S^ D 
Qx • 
Ei^n 
i. 
2, 
4. 
5. 
6. 
/. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
by me/us m ihe course of official dimes, on '"Vc n A 2 /, 2JC£<X' a / OPis 
Last pnor check of ihis instrument was done on /^L 2 2 7}o<~>\~ 
This was done by a currently cemSed technician and according ro the siandaids 
established by the Comxuissioner of the UtaH Departmenr o£ Public Safety. 
This is the official record and notes of this procedure which were made at the time these 
tests were done. 
I am/We are competent to testify and have personal knowledge of the matters alleged m 
this cerrificaie. 
THE FOLLOWING TESTS WERE MADE: 
Electrical Power Check: 
(Red power switch on. Displays "Not Ready") 
Temperature Check: 
(Displays "Push button to start test", etc) 
Internal Puree Check: 
(Air pump wanes, runs for approximately 12 to 15 seconds.) 
Internal Calibration Check: 
(Internal standards within factory specifications) 
Invalid Test: 
(Push the green start test button while the instrument is in test mode.) 
Diagnostic Check: 
(Prom check, Ram check, Temperature check, Processor check, Printer check) 
Checked with Known Sampie: 
(Simulator, 3 tests within + or - .00 
Gives Readings in: 
(Grams of Alcohol / 210 liters of Breath) 
The Simulator Solution: 
fWas of the correct kind and properly compounded) 
The Results af This Test Show: 
(That the instrument is working properly) 
.005 or 5% whichever is greatest; 
REPAIRS REQUIRED: (Explain) /Ktffpa,>\ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STEVEN WINWARD 
5681 South 320 West 
Murray, Utah 84107 
My Commission Expires 
May 5, 2007 
STATE OF UTAH 
(NOTARY SEAL) 
Subscribed and sworn before me this 
(Day) 
7^  XAAWJ** A 
CESUFBED BREATH TEST TECHNICIANS 
I/We, on oath, statejhe foregoing is true. 
ay of /Ae^U^ ^t^5~ 
"7 BiACromi tetf 1OTM 
Utah Department of Public Safety 
Certificate of Calibration 
Inioxilvzer 5000 / 80G0 
I We the undersigned, beme first dulv sworn, state that. /£^//>> /O <7 "^^ 
1 Bream testing msumnenr INTQXSLYSE^, senal number J^Z—J^jd^22& 
located at 37*-- £ • r P* "//j^ffs^' was propeny checked 
by nte'us in the course of oi&ciaj aunes. on /fi?S// AJ7 j&e'Cr a //i?/* 
Last prior check of this instrument was done on ,^7^K.<' 2/ J J>^J" 
2. Tins was done by a currently cemfied technician and according to me standards 
estaonsned oy the Commissionei oi the Utah Department of Public Safety. 
3 This is the official record and notes of this procedure which were made at the time these 
tests were done. 
4. I am/We are competent to testify and have personal knowledge of the matters alleged m 
this cernflcare. 
Yss/No-
tf/u 
a 
THE FOLLOWING TESTS WERE MABE: 
1 Electrical Power Check: 
(Red power switch on Displays "Not Ready") 
Tenroerarare Check: 
(Displays "Push duttonto start test", etc) 
Iniernal Puree Check: 
{Air pump works, runs for approxunarely 12 to 15 seconds.) 
Internal Calibration Check: 
(Iniernal standards within factory specifications) 
Invalid Test: 
(Push the green start test button while ihe instrument is m test mode ) 
Diagnostic Check: 
(Prom check, Ham check, Temperature check, Processor check. Printer check; 
Checked with Known Sample: 
(Simulator, 3 tests within + or - 005 or 5% whichever is greatest) 
Gives Readings in: 
(Grams of Alcohol / 210 Liters of Breath) 
The Simulator Solution: 
fWas of the correct kind and properly compounded) 
The ResuJta of This Test Show: 
(That the instrument is working properly) 
EEPAIRS REQUIRED: (Explain). 
3 
10 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
PAUL KOTTER 
5681 South 320 West 
Murray Utah B4107 
My Commission Expires 
April 21 2007 
STATE 0 ? UTAH 
CERTIFIED BREATH TEST TECHNICIANS 
/J7We, en oath, state,the foregoing is true. 
(NOTARY SEAL; /^g? 4?J&IS -7 
Subscribed and sworn before me this / / day of /4y7//> / 
-v 
(Day) 
. PLAINTIFFS 
h EXHIBIT 
II 3 EiACTarm xe* 10/M 
